Organizational Resistance to Destructive Narcissistic Behavior

As destructive narcissists attain positions of power, unethical behavior ensues. Organizational identity shifts in response. As a result, unethical decisions become amplified in organizational structure and practices and embedded in technology. Little research related to how employees respond to organizational events, cost/benefit analysis of such, or the effects of negative treatment of employees by organizations is available. As persons become aware of the circumstances generated by destructive narcissistic behavior and informed about the consequences, some will resist. In this article, we provide a model illustrating factors that may give rise to such organizational resistance to destructive arrogant narcissism.     

Unemployment,tariffs and the theory of international trade

In this paper, we introduce diminishing returns to scale in Brecher's model of international trade with unemployment and then investigate some issues embodied in the theory of international trade. Our principal results are that tariffs need not improve a country's terms of trade and that capital accumulation also need not result in a predictable change in the terms of trade.     

Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats’ behaviour. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected policy change that tightened and formalised constraints on bureaucrats’ misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018 that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market reaction.     

Allocation to Anchor Investors,Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs

We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.     

Complementary or conflictual? Formal participation,informal participation,and organizational performance

Most studies of worker participation examine either formal participatory structures or informal participation. Yet, increasingly, works councils and other formal participatory bodies are operating in parallel with collective bargaining or are filling the void left by its decline. Moreover, these bodies are sprouting in workplaces in which workers have long held a modicum of influence, authority, and production‐ or service‐related information. This study leverages a case from the health care sector to examine the interaction between formal and informal worker participation. Seeking to determine whether or not these two forces—each independently shown to benefit production or service delivery—complement or undermine one another, we find evidence for the latter. In the case of the 27 primary care departments that we study, formal structures appeared to help less‐participatory departments improve their performance. However, these same structures also appeared to impede those departments with previously high levels of informal participation. While we remain cautious with respect to generalizability, the case serves as a warning to those seeking to institute participation in an environment in which some workers have long felt they had the requisite authority, influence, and information necessary to perform their jobs effectively.     

Does Competition Lead to Agglomeration or Dispersion in EMR Vendor Decisions?

We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to hospital market structure. As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives to coordinate or differentiate in their choice of vendors. We find evidence of substantial agglomeration on EMR vendors, which increases as hospital markets become more competitive. These findings suggest that incentives to coordinate dominate incentives to differentiate overall, and the relative balance grows stronger in favor of coordination as markets become more competitive. Our findings also have important implications regarding antitrust policy. A potential downside of hospital consolidation—increased obstacles in information sharing due to vendor differentiation—should be taken into account in evaluation of hospital mergers.